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Abstract 
 
The State of Washington enacted a school district bond credit enhancement 
program in 1999.  Oregon did the same in 1998.  I use data from the National 
Center for Education Statistics for a representative sample of states in order to 
examine whether or not these programs increased the likelihood that school 
districts in Washington and Oregon issued bonds.  I isolate the programs’ impact in 
Washington and Oregon through difference-in-differences analysis to control for 
other variation in the data in ten other representative states during the same time 
period.  The results suggest that state-level school district bond guarantee programs 
increase the likelihood of district bond issues. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 Do school district bond guarantee programs matter?  Many school districts 
engage in capital projects, which can include new schools, additions, renovations, 
equipment purchases, etc.  They require a significant amount of upfront 
investment.  Districts usually pursue this type of investment through bond issues.  
Any bond issued by a municipal (local) authority is referred to as a “municipal 
bond,” and a majority of bonds issued by school districts are General Obligation 
Bonds (GO) and voter-approved.  GO bonds require municipalities to pledge their 
full taxing authority and tax revenues as collateral to repay bondholders.  They 
often require the municipality to pledge a property tax to meet debt service 
requirements.   
 The typical format is for school districts to pursue bond insurance on their 
own with a private insurer.  However, several states have introduced different types 
of state-run bond insurance programs, including Washington in 1999, and Oregon 
in 1998.  These programs are the source of my identification, as I use data from the 
National Center for Education Statistics for a representative sample of states in 
order to examine whether or not these programs increased the likelihood that school 
districts in Washington and Oregon issued bonds.  I isolate the programs’ impact in 
Washington and Oregon through difference-in-differences analysis to control for 
other variation in the data in ten other representative states during the same time 
period.  The results suggest that state-level school district bond guarantee programs 
increase the likelihood of district bond issues. 
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I begin with a background and literature review in section II, followed by my 
empirical strategy in section III, data in section IV, results in section V, and 
conclusion in section VI. 
II. Background and Related Literature 
School districts, as well as any entity that considers issuing bonds, must 
decide whether or not to have their bond issue rated.  There is a typical cost-benefit 
analysis that is at least briefly considered by school district finance officials.  There 
is no uniform list of reasons why a district should or should not pursue a rating, as 
Gist (2009) suggests that bond raters appear to evaluate a wide range of 
information during the rating process.  Ratings provide a number of benefits to both 
the school district and prospective bondholder.  They provide valuable independent 
analysis of the district’s financial condition to help sell municipal bonds on the 
primary market.  Ratings are necessary to attract non-local or institutional 
investors, as state and federal law restricts their investments to “investment-grade” 
securities (Harris 2003). 
 However, not all school districts will benefit from paying a fee to have their 
bond rated.  Mary H. Harris and Vincent G. Munley (2002) note that school district 
size may be an advantage in a bond rating process, as rating agencies clearly take 
the ability of a district’s population to pay taxes into account.  If district size 
matters, then a smaller district that believes there is a high likelihood that the bond 
will receive an unfavorable rating may forgo the process, thereby missing the 
opportunity to receive institutional investors’ dollars.  The benefits may not 
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outweigh the costs for some districts.  Another possibility is that a district that does 
not expect to have many non-local investors interested in its bond issue may not 
need the external validity and approval of a rating issued by an agency in order to 
generate appeal amongst local investors.  These local investors may already know 
enough about the district’s reputation, financial condition, and characteristics to 
judge whether or not they are interested in its bond issue on their own.   
Poorly performing school districts may also struggle to obtain a favorable 
rating.  D. Denison, W. Yan, and Z. Zhao (2007) use an ordered probit maximum 
likelihood model show that districts that improve the percent of students passing 
standardized tests and increase the number of students admitted to college increase 
their probability of getting a higher bond credit rating.   
However, even if the school district fears receipt of an unfavorable rating 
from a rating agency, district officials may decide to go ahead and seek a bond 
rating anyway.  From 1991-1993, the average rating fee was $7,000, and national 
statistics show Moody’s and S&P rate the majority (58 percent) of rated bonds 
(Harris 2003).  If the district’s fears are confirmed, they then have the option to 
purchase bond insurance.  Bond insurance represents an additional expense to the 
district, adding on to a potentially expensive bond-issue process.  Those districts 
that do purchase bond insurance almost always receive an upgrade to the highest 
rating, as the private insurance agency guarantees the district’s debt obligation for 
a fee to the school district.  Insurance premiums involve an assessment of the 
districts’ financial condition and risk of default (Harris 2003).  Todd Ely (2012) finds 
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evidence that bond insurance premiums rose dramatically following the 2007-2008 
fiscal crisis, even when controlling for widening credit spreads and changes in the 
underlying credit quality of issuers.  With this in mind, some school districts that 
would benefit from purchasing insurance may not be able to do so.  This fact 
inspires my research question, as the implementation of a state-level bond issue 
guarantee changes the landscape for school districts that decide against private 
insurance. 
  There are four categories of state-level bond credit enhancement programs.  
The first is State Guarantee Programs, where states pledge their full faith and 
credit to qualified school district bonds.  The second is State Aid 
Intercept/Withholding Programs, where the district’s state-level revenue is diverted 
to bondholders in the event of faulty debt servicing.  The third is State 
Appropriation Programs, where state funds are used to resolve any shortage of 
district funds to service debt.  The fourth and final category is State Fund 
Programs, where dollars from constitutionally created state funds are used to 
resolve any shortage of district funds to service debt.  Some of these programs 
involve a direct link between the state’s rating and the district bond issue’s rating, 
while others do not.  Table A1 in Appendix A displays the various types of programs 
in each state in my dataset, as well as their implementation year.   
 My paper focuses on Oregon and Washington’s State Guarantee Programs, 
where the state pledges its full faith and credit behind qualified district bonds.  It is 
important to note that my question simply examines whether or not state-level 
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school district bond guarantee programs increase the likelihood that a school 
district will issue bonds.  There is some evidence that districts that pass bond issues 
through the referendum process are rewarded with an immediate increase of 
housing prices.  It suggests that parents value improvements in other types of 
school output such as safety and facility quality that might not be captured by test 
scores, even after controlling for demographic changes (Cellini et. al 2008).  This 
evidence suggests that public opinion positively values capital spending.  However, 
while a wide range of literature examines whether or not capital projects or 
increased spending in general improve student outcomes, this paper does not.  It 
simply examines whether or not state-level bond guarantee programs have any 
effect on a school district’s propensity to issue bonds – a simple question that is not 
often found in the literature. 
III. Empirical Strategy 
  Do state-level school district bond guarantee programs have any effect on a 
school district’s propensity to issue bonds?  To answer this question, I could take 
one of two approaches: I could focus on the bond rating improvements obtained 
through the credit-enhancement program, or I can look for data on bond issues, 
regardless of their rating.  I chose the latter approach, as most credit enhancement 
programs and bond insurance agencies automatically improve the bond issue’s 
rating (Harris 2003). 
 If a state creates a school district bond guarantee program, I can look at 
changes in district behavior with regards to bond issues before and after this state-
  
7  
level policy change.  However, any conclusions from this data alone, local to the 
state where the policy change occurred, will simply suggest correlation but not 
causation.  To overcome this limitation, I examine variation in school district bond 
issues inside and outside of the state where the policy change occurred, before and 
after the introduction of the bond guarantee program.  Ideally, I would use as large 
of a sample of school districts as possible – one idea is to gather data for all 50 U.S. 
states.  However, this idea runs into a few issues, as education climates vary by 
state. 
 With this concern in mind, I decided to use a representative sample of 12 U.S. 
states.  This list is drawn from research conducted by Mary Harris (2001), as she 
explains how these 10 states are a representative sample of different education 
system structures, policies, and environments, in different regions of the country.  
For example, her selection of states is made in light of different referendum 
requirements, debt limit policies, the varying independence of school districts, 
voting majority definitions, and various capital state funding practices. The 10 
states are: Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, and Oregon.  I add Texas and Washington to the sample, as a 
majority of the remaining school district bond literature uses Texas data, and I use 
Washington as one of my two sources of identification.  Texas is large in size and 
has a school district bond credit enhancement program (state permanent fund).  It 
also adopted standardized testing earlier than most states.  Although California is a 
larger state than Texas with regards to population, California’s public education 
  
8  
system is subject to unique and unrepresentative circumstances due to the Serrano 
court decision. 
 Table A1 in appendix A lists various types of state-level school district bond 
issue credit enhancement programs within my list of sample states.  As mentioned 
earlier, only Oregon and Washington have bond guarantee programs, where the 
state pledges its full faith and credit to qualified school district bonds.  These 
programs are the source of my identification, as opposed to credit enhancement 
programs that fall into other categories, such as those that divert state aid intended 
for schools to bondholders in times of financial trouble.  However, I also account for 
the 2002 enactment of a credit enhancement program in New Jersey with an 
additional dummy variable, even though it is structured differently than a bond 
guarantee program.  Kentucky’s 2004 program only applies to Universities, and 
therefore has no impact on my estimates. 
 If the number of school districts that issue bonds after the introduction of a 
bond guarantee program increases, after controlling for unobserved variation 
through an analysis of a representative sample of states, this suggests that the 
bond guarantee program changes the financial possibilities for school districts and 
increases their propensity to raise funds for capital projects through bond issues.  If 
the number of school districts that issue bonds after the program’s introduction falls 
with the controls included, then the bond guarantee program likely has a negative 
effect on a district’s propensity to raise funds through bond issues.   
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 I develop a model to evaluate the effect of Washington and Oregon’s school 
district bond guarantee programs, according to the following specification: 
 
Equation 1: 
 
 
 My dependent variable, BONDISSUE, is a binary outcome variable of 0 or 1, 
where 1 represents a district bond issue, and 0 represents no issue.  My first 
independent variable is BONDINS, a dummy variable equal to 1 for all Washington 
school districts from 1999 - 2009 and Oregon school districts from 1998 - 2009, and 
0 for all other states and years.  This uniquely identifies the policy change that 
serves as my identification.  I expect BONDINS to be positively correlated with 
BONDISSUE because the state-level school district bond guarantee programs in 
Washington and Oregon simplify the bond issue process and improve financial 
opportunities for school districts in an intuitive and theoretical interpretation.  The 
other dummy variable, NJQBP, simply accounts for the existence of a state fund 
program in New Jersey from 2002 – 2009 for all school districts in the state. 
 The third independent variable is a vector X, that includes PWHITE, which is 
equal to the percent of enrolled students whose race is “white,” ENROLL, equal to 
the total number of enrolled students in the district, LTE - an acronym for local tax 
effort represented by local revenue per student divided by per capita personal 
income (both components adjusted for inflation), INGVTPP - an acronym for inter-
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governmental revenue per pupil or total per pupil revenue to each district from 
state and federal sources (adjusted for inflation), and GROSSDEBT, equal to long 
and short term debt outstanding at the end of the year divided by ENROLL 
(adjusted for inflation).  I expect PWHITE to be positively correlated with 
BONDISSUE, as I assume a majority of school districts that issue bonds are in 
strong financial standing and of higher quality.  I use PWHITE to proxy for this 
expectation.  I anticipate a positive correlation between ENROLL and 
BONDISSUE, as Harris (2003) suggests that larger districts receive higher ratings 
due to a perceived larger tax base, population, and tax revenue generation ability.  I 
expect LTE and INGVTPP to be negatively correlated with BONDISSUE, as 
districts with higher local tax revenues likely have less need of additional revenue, 
and districts with large amounts of state and federal aid likely have less need of 
alternative sources of additional revenue.  Lastly, I anticipate a negative 
relationship between GROSSDEBT and BONDISSUE, as I imagine that districts 
with high amounts of outstanding debt will acknowledge the likelihood that this 
financial position will be penalized through the bond ratings they may receive on a 
new issue. 
 There are also dummy variables for each year (δt), which are dummies for all 
years of sufficient data (excluding the first year, 1997) across all observations and 
variables from 1998-2009: δ1(1998) + δ2(1999) + … + δ12(2009).  I also include 
district fixed effects (γ i) to impose time-independent effects for each district that 
could be correlated with the independent variables.  By using fixed effects, I am 
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able to incorporate difference in differences analysis into my evaluation of this 
policy change in Oregon and Washington.   
 I estimate equation 1 using two different econometric frameworks.  First, I 
use OLS in model I with a linear probability model.1  The second framework (model 
II) involves a maximum log-likelihood model.  Both the OLS and Logistic 
regressions are modeled using fixed-effects.  This controls for between-district 
variation, and allows me to isolate the within-district variation in whether or not a 
district issued bonds.  All results are reported in Appendix B.  
IV. Data 
 Ideally, data used to answer this question include a) whether or not school 
districts issued bonds in a large sample of years before and after Washington and 
Oregon’s policy changes b) some demographic variables c) some financial variables, 
especially those that concern the district’s ability to raise revenue in other ways or 
its receipt of large amounts of revenue from other branches of government and d) 
some economic variables, such as household income for the town each school district 
is in. 
 I obtained a majority of my data from the National Center for Education 
Statistics, a division of the U.S. Department of Education.  I also retrieved per 
capita personal income by county and GDP deflator data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  I used the GDP deflator to adjust several figures for inflation,                                                         
1 In unreported regression results, I then use this the same linear probability model with standard 
errors clustered by state, to ensure robustness and to identify the variation at the state-level.  It is 
not evident that clustering significantly improved the results – if anything, it strengthens 
BONDINS’ impact on BONDISSUE, whereas we would expect clustered standard errors to result in 
a weaker effect.  The standard errors did not change much with clustering. 
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as I compare them over time.  Additionally, I calculated some variables used in the 
final regression using the retrieved NCES data.  Sufficient data exists across all 
variables of interest for 1997-2009.  Per capita personal income (used in LTE) is by 
county, not by town - this is one limitation of the dataset. 
 Summary statistics for the variables used in all regression analyses are 
displayed below in table A2 of appendix A.  Figure 1 in Appendix A displays the 
mean of the binary BONDISSUE variable for the two states of interest and the rest 
of the states in the sample from 1997-2009.  It appears that the program had a 
slightly lagged effect on the probability that school districts issue bonds.  Further 
research could examine the decline after 2003. 
V. Results 
 I estimate equation 1 using two different econometric frameworks.  First, I 
use a linear probability model (OLS).  The second framework involves a logit model.  
Results for the OLS panel regression (model I) are displayed in Table B1 in 
Appendix B.  These coefficient results suggest that Washington and Oregon’s bond 
guarantee programs (BONDINS) increase the probability of a district bond issue by 
almost 77 percent (I divide the estimated coefficient of 0.0686 by the sample mean 
of 0.0895).  This is consistent with my expectation that the bond guarantee 
programs result in a positive increase in the likelihood that a school district in 
Washington or Oregon issues bonds.   
 Results for the logistic regression (model II) are displayed in Table B1 in 
Appendix B.  Coefficients are instead reported as an “odds-ratio.”  Odds represent 
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the expected number of “successes” for each “failure.”  Districts with the 
Washington and Oregon state-level bond guarantee programs available were 86 
percent more likely to issue bonds.   
The linear probability model (model I) estimates a slightly smaller effect of 
BONDINS than the logistic regression (model II).  It is difficult to compare the two 
models in detail, as ordinary least squares and logistic regression differ.  For 
example, OLS requires homoscedasticity, while logistic regression does not.  It 
appears that model II estimates a slightly larger effect, but regardless, both the 
OLS linear probability model and the logistic regression estimate a positive and 
significant effect of Washington and Oregon’s bond guarantee programs on the 
propensity of school districts to issue bonds.  This effect persists after controlling for 
unobserved underlying changes before and after the programs across a 
representative sample of ten other states.  District size (as measured by school 
enrollment) does not seem to have a significant effect, nor does non-local revenue for 
the OLS model.   
VI. Conclusions 
 I use two fixed-effect models (OLS and Logit) with the same specification to 
examine the impact of Washington and Oregon’s school district bond guarantee 
programs on the likelihood that a school district issues bonds.  I control for 
unobserved variation in a representative sample of ten other states before and after 
the program’s inception in Oregon in 1998 and Washington in 1999.  My analysis to 
estimate the effect of these bond guarantee programs involves difference-in-
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differences analysis and suggests that the programs have a positive and significant 
effect on the likelihood that school districts issue bonds after their inception.  The 
programs’ positive and significant effect is robust across both the panel data OLS 
regression and the panel data logistic regression. 
 Future research could make use of district-level income data instead of 
county-level data.  Additional research on these programs could also examine their 
effects on the actual ratings assigned to Washington and Oregon’s school districts’ 
bond issues.  This would involve collecting rating data for each school district in 
each state before and after 1999 (1998).   
 Overall, my estimates suggest a positive outcome for school districts in 
Washington and Oregon, if the reader assumes that increased capital spending 
through bond issuance is a desirable outcome for school districts, in accordance with 
the evidence presented by Cellini et all (2008).  Other states could use this finding 
to support the potential gains from a school district bond guarantee program – a 
state-level alternative to private bond insurance.  Since most state-level bond 
insurance programs guarantee district voter-approved issues, they are likely more 
generous than private insurers, on average.  Some may find this policy outcome 
desirable. 
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Appendix A: 
 
Table A1: Various State Municipal Bond Programs in Sample States 
Type Year 
State Guarantee Programs: 
 Oregon School Bond Guarantee Program 1998 
Washington School Bond Guarantee Program 1999 
  State Aid Intercept/Withholding Programs: 
 Georgia State Aid Intercept Program 1991 
Kentucky State Aid Intercept Program 1994 
Kentucky State Aid Intercept Program for Commonwealth 
Universities 2004 
  State Fund Programs: 
 New Jersey Additional State Aid Bonds Program Pre-1990 
New Jersey Fund for the Support of the Free Public Schools Program 1980 
New Jersey Qualified Bond Program 2002 
Texas Permanent School Fund Program 1983 
Texas Higher Education Bond Program 1985 
Sources: Standard & Poor's State Credit Enhancement Programs, November 2008.  
Stone & Youngberg Municipal Credit Group, March 2011 
 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics for All Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bondissue 62608 0.2047342 0.4035105 0 1 
bondins 62608 0.0895572 0.2855487 0 1 
njqbp 62608 0.0661257 0.2485037 0 1 
pwhite 62608 0.6963163 0.295723 0 2.8 
enroll 62608 2924.025 10115.27 1 477610 
lte 62608 0.1599459 0.166088 0 5.107666 
ingvtpp 62608 6442.476 5862.402 0 756720.9 
grossdebt 62608 4643.033 6687.195 0 426343.5 
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19  
Appendix B: 
Table B1: Regression Results for Models I and II 
 
Model I (LPM) Model II (Logit) 
  Coefficient Coefficient Odds Ratio 
bondins 0.0686*** 0.622*** 1.863*** 
 
(0.0142) (0.108) (0.202) 
njqbp -0.0539*** -0.476*** 0.621*** 
 
(0.00958) (0.0935) (0.0581) 
pwhite 0.117*** 1.698*** 5.461*** 
 
(0.0291) (0.314) (1.712) 
enroll 0.00000171 0.0000189 1 
 
(0.00000149) (0.0000125) (0.0000125) 
lte -0.0520** -1.049*** 0.350*** 
 
(0.0204) (0.263) (0.092) 
ingvtpp -1.25E-08 -2.49e-05*** 1.000*** 
 
(0.000000321) (0.00000901) (0.00000901) 
grossdebt 1.54e-05*** 0.000167*** 1.000*** 
 
(0.000000328) (0.00000395) (0.00000395) 
Constant 0.0862*** N/A N/A 
 
(0.0227)   
 Observations 62608 45121 45121 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Note: Difference in observations due to multiple positive outcomes 
within groups encountered in -xtlogit-.  1968 groups (17487 obs) 
dropped in Model II because of all positive or all negative outcomes. 
 
